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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I , Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to 
consider the mitigating circumstances presented by the Appellant 
at the sentencing hearing held pursuant to U.C.A, § "'7 6-3-201 (5) (c)? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is i Petition for Rehearing of the decision filed by this 
Court on March 29, 1991. On a prior appeal this Coin t affirmed the 
Appellant's convictions for Aggravated Sexual Assault and Aggra-
vated Kidnapping, but vacated the Appellantfs original sentences 
because they di d not conform !u the .statutory punishments for the 
offenses for which he was convicted* The Appellant was then 
sentenced ; three (3) concurrent minimum-mandatory terms of 10 
years to 1.: - - AppoJIrant 'hen appealed his sentences to this 
Court contending that the corrected harsher sentences imposed by 
the trial court violated U.C.A. § 76-3-405 and offended the double 
jeopardy provision of the IJniind States Constitution. This Court 
rejected those contentions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts si this rase are ,eil known 4~s> this Court. State 
v. Babbel, 770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989) (Babbe. . „ .. ^ Utah 
Adv.Rep. 47 (Babbel II) However, in addition to the facts already 
known Is i. this I'UIJI t , a few additional facts are necessary in order 
to review the issue presented herein. 
1 
On March 24, 1989, the Appellant appeared with counsel before 
the trial court for a re-sentencing pursuant to this Court's order 
in Babbel I. Appellant's counsel presented the Court with a number 
of mitigation reports. These reports included the Appellant's Utah 
State Prison records, a report from Southwest Utah Mental Health, 
a report from Intermountain Sexual Abuse Treatment (I.S.A.T.), and 
a record of volunteer work in the community. None of these reports 
are part of the record. However, the record of the sentencing 
hearing clearly reflects that they were provided to the court and 
the prosecution. (3/24/89 Transcript, pgs. 6-7). All of the 
reports were favorable to the Appellant. 
However, when the trial judge imposed sentence, he refused to 
consider any of the mitigating circumstances presented by the 
Appellant: 
Although your record, since the time of con-
viction, has been exemplary, I am not sure 
that's what the statute takes into consider-
ation when it talks about mitigation or aggra-
vation. I'm really talking about the facts of 
the crime itself. I find nothing in this case 
which would be aggravating and nothing which 
would be mitigating in particular; therefore, 
on each of those terms I am going to impose 
the middle sentence of minimum-mandatory of 
ten years and which may be for life. Each of 
those three to run concurrently. 
(3/24/91 Transcript, pg. 13). 
2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to consider 
how the Appellant had conducted himself during the four (4) years 
of incarceration between the time ot his
 rn IHS! MMI! t he t nut;;* ot lii.-.i 
re-sentencing. The statute which sets forth the sentencing 
framework for minimum-mandatory offenses, T "\ A . § '76-3-201( 5)(c), 
states quite clearly that J .:.--»* : -. : - 1 
in the case, the probation officer's report, other reports. . . . 
statements in aggravation i nitigation submitted ^ne prosecu-
tion or the defendan t: • - \ . i-i. : . ed at' the 
sentencing hearing." he n- • =-i court's refusal t ven consider 
the mitigating circumstances presented by the Appellant mandates 
remanding t.his mat lei Jul .mother sentent mtj hedi ini| with instiiir-
tions to the trial court to at least consider the Appellant's 
mitigating circumstances• 
INTRODUCTION 
This Petition for Rehearing is filed pursuant to Pule *-•• ii+ab 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. in Brown v. Pickard, denying 
rehearmu, II !J , "ml " i lit dti IMHh), 1 IH* Ht-ah Supreme Court estab-
lished the standard for granting a Petition for Rehearing, stating: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the Court 
failed to consider some material point in the 
case, or that it erred in its conclusions.... . 
11 P. at 512 
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Later, in Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (1913), this 
Court added: 
To make an application for rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to dis-
courage the practice of filing Petitions for 
Rehearings in proper cases. When this Court, 
however, has considered and decided all of 
the material questions involved in a case, a 
rehearing should not be applied for, unless we 
have misconstrued, or overlooked some statute 
or decision which may affect the result, or 
that we have based the decision on some wrong 
principle of law, or have either misapplied or 
overlooked something which materially effects 
the result . . . . If there are some reasons, 
however, such as we have indicated above, or 
other good reasons, a Petition for a Rehearing 
should be properly filed, and if it is merito-
rious, its form will in no case be scrutinized 
by this Court. 
Id at 624. 
The argument advanced in this Petition has not been previously 
presented. However, this argument is in support of the Appellant's 
attack on the lawfulness of his sentences. This case has charted 
an unusual procedural course. The Appellant's brief in Babbel II 
was filed pro se. This Court appointed Joan Watt with the Salt 
Lake Legal Defender Association to present oral arguments on behalf 
of the Appellant. The undersigned counsel was subsequently ap-
pointed to review the merits of filing a Petition for Rehearing. 
Significantly, the Appellant did not have the benefit of counsel 
when he filed his brief in support of the Babbel II appeal. 
Because of the complexity of the issues, the Court of Appeals 
recently granted the State's Petition for Rehearing in State v. 
4 
Sampson, 156 Utah Adv.Rep. 4 (1991), notwithstanding that the State 
had failed to raise certain arguments in its initial appeal. The 
Appellant submits that the unique procedural posture of this case 
justifies visiting the issue presented herein. A review of the 
record from the sentencing hearing discloses that an error has been 
overlooked "which materially affects the result." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REFUSING TO 
CONSIDER THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED BY 
THE APPELLANT AND AUTHORIZED BY U.C.A. § 76-3-201(5)(c). 
In Babbel I, this Court vacated the Appellant's original 
sentences because they did not conform to the statutory punishments 
for the offenses for which he was convicted. The sentences first 
imposed were illegal because the trial court treated the convic-
tions as if they were ordinary first degree felonies, rather than 
first degree felonies subject to minimum-mandatory sentences. 
Based upon the mandate of U.C.A. § 77-35-22(e) (supp. 1981), this 
Court directed that the Appellant be re-sentenced in Babbel II. 
At the time of the re-sentencing on March 24, 1989, the 
Appellant had been incarcerated for nearly four (4) years. During 
the period of his incarceration at the Utah State Prison, the 
Appellant availed himself of many treatment and rehabilitation 
programs offered by the Department of Corrections. These counsel-
5 
ing programs included the Intermountain Sexual Abuse Treatment 
(I.S.A.T. ) and a Southwest Utah Mental Health program. Additional-
ly, the Appellant received no disciplinary write-ups while housed 
at the Utah State Prison. 
In eschewing this mitigation evidence, the trial judge did not 
rule that the evidence failed to justify imposing the lowest term 
of severity. Instead, the trial court made the threshold decisijpn 
to not even consider the proffered evidence. The judge erroneously 
believed that he was constrained to consider aggravation and 
mitigation in the context of only the crime. The trial court 
elaborated on this reasoning by stating, "I'm really talking about 
the facts of the crime itself." (3/24/89 Transcript, pg. 13). 
Yet nothing in the governing statute requires such a limita-
tion on the evidence. U.C.A. § 76-3-201(5)(c) provides: 
In determining whether there are circumstances 
that justify imposition of the highest or 
lowest term, the court may consider the record 
in the case, the probation officer's report, 
other reports, including reports received 
under section 76-3-404, statements in aggrava-
tion or mitigation submitted by the prosecu-
tion or the defendant, and any further evi-
dence introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
American jurisprudence has long endeavored to individualize 
punishment to fit the particular defendant and his circumstances. 
In Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), it was reversible 
error to exclude evidence of the defendant's good conduct in prison 
6 
at his sentencing hearing. The Court noted, "A defendant's 
disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life 
in prison is itself an aspect of his character that is by its 
nature relevant to the sentencing determination." The relevance 
of a defendant's good or bad behavior while incarcerated pending 
a successful appeal was considered in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 
U.S. 711 (1969). In Pearce, the United States Supreme Court ruled 
that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully 
attacked a conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives 
after the granting of a new trial. In reaching this result, the 
Court noted that: 
A trial judge is not constitutionally pre-
cluded, in other words, from imposing a new 
sentence, whether greater or less than the 
original sentence, in the light of events 
subsequent to the first trial that may have 
thrown new light upon the defendant's "life, 
health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral 
propensities." Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 
241 (1948). (Emphasis supplied). 
Because this Court vacated the Appellant's original unlawful 
sentence, he should have been entitled to reap the benefits of his 
excellent prison record when he appeared before the trial court for 
the imposition of sentence. When re-sentencing a criminal defen-
dant under these circumstances, there is no constitutional or 
statutory limitation on the evidence which the judge may consider: 
Such information may come to the judge's 
attention from evidence adduced at the second 
7 
trial itself, from a new presentence investi-
gation, from the defendant's prison record, or 
possibly from other sources. The freedom of 
a sentencing judge to consider the defendant's 
conduct subsequent to the first conviction in 
imposing a new sentence is no more than con-
sonant with the principle, fully approved in 
Williams v. New York, supra, that a state may 
adopt the "prevalent modern philosophy of 
penology that the punishment should fit the 
offender and not merely the crime." 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723. 
CONCLUSION 
The proffered mitigation evidence was relevant and should have 
been considered by the trial judge. The trial court's failure to 
consider this evidence constitutes an abuse of discretion and man-
dates that this matter be remanded to the trial court with an 
instruction that the proffered mitigation evidence be considered 
and weighed under the framework set forth in U.C.A. § 76-3-201(5)(c) 
DATED this day of > N * ° ^ - , 1991. 
/ALTER F. BUGDEN,/JR< WALTER 
Attorney for Petition* 
CERTIFICATION 
I, WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR., do hereby certify that I am the 
attorney appointed to represent the Appellant, William H. Babbel, 
in this case; and that this Petition for Rehearing is presented to 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
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